In the seventies and early eighties, advocates of the specie provisions in Art. 1, §10, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution made a concerted effort to educate people about this constitutional provision, consequently people (mostly those who were deperate and ill-prepared) acting pro se began litigating the issue. The courts have rendered the following adverse decisions on this issue:
Adverse Federal Decisions:
1. Koll v. Wayzata State Bank,
397 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1968)
2. United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1973)
3. Milam v. United States, 524 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1974)
4. United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975)
5. United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1976)
6. United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976)
7. United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1976)
8. United States v. Schmitz, 542 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976)
9. United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976)
10. United States v. Hurd, 549 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1977)
11. Mathes v. Commissioner, 576 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1978)
12. United States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1978)
13. United States v. Anderson, 584 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1978)
14. United States v. Benson, 592 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1979)
15. Nyhus v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir. 1979)
16. United States v. Hori, 470 F.Supp. 1209 (C.D.Cal. 1979)
17. United States v. Tissi, 601 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1979)
18. United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979)
19. United States v. Moon, 616 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1980)
20. United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1980)
21. Birkenstock v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981)
22. Lary v. Commissioner, 842 F.2d 296 (11th Cir. 1988)
Adverse State Decisions:
1. Chermack v. Bjornson, 302
Minn. 213, 223 N.W.2d 659 (1974)
2. Leitch v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue, 519 P.2d 1045 (Or.App. 1974)
3. Radue v. Zanaty, 293 Ala. 585, 308 So.2d 242 (1975)
4. Rush v. Casco Bank Trust Co., 348 A.2d 237 (Me. 1975)
5. Allen v. Craig, 1 Kan.App.2d 301, 564 P.2d 552 (1977)
6. State v. Pina, 90 N.M. 181, 561 P.2d 43 (N.M. 1977)
7. Dorgan v. Kouba, 274 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1978)
8. Trohimovich v. Dir., Dept. of Labor Industry, 21 Wash.App. 243, 584 P.2d 467 (1978)
9. Middlebrook v. Miss. State Tax Comm., 387 So.2d 726 (Miss. 1980)
10. Daniels v. Arkansas Power Light Co., 601 S.W.2d 845 (Ark. 1980)
11. State v. Gasser, 306 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1981)
12. City of Colton v. Corbly, 323 N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 1982)
13. Epperly v. Alaska, 648 P.2d 609 (Ak.App. 1982)
14. Solyom v. Maryland-National Capital Park Planning Comm., 452 A.2d 1283 (Md.App. 1982)
15. People v. Lawrence, 124 Mich.App. 230, 333 N.W.2d 525 (Mich.App. 1983)
16. Union State Bank v. Miller, 335 N.W.2d 807 (N.D. 1983)
17. Richardson v. Richardson, 332 N.W.2d 524 (Mich.App. 1983)
18. Cohn v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 138 Ariz. 136, 673 P.2d 334 (1983)
19. First Nat. Bank of Black Hills v. Treadway, 339 N.W.2d 119 (S.D. 1983)
20. Herald v. State, 107 Idaho 640, 691 P.2d 1255 (1984)
21. Allnutt v. State, 59 Md.App. 694, 478 A.2d 321 (1984)
22. Spurgeon v. F.T.B., 160 Cal.App.3d 524, 206 Cal.Rptr. 636 (1984)
23. Rothaker v. Rockwall County Central Appraisal Dist., 703 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.App. 1985)
24. De Jong v. County of Chester, 98 Pa. Cmwlth. 85, 510 A.2d 902 (1986)
25. Baird v. County Assessors of Salt Lake Utah Counties, 779 P.2d 676 (Utah 1989)
26. State v. Sanders, 923 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. 1996).
II. Wages Are Not Income:
Back in about 1979 or 1980, Bob Golden and Pete Soehnlen published a work entitled Are You Required, which persuasively advocated the argument that wages are not income. However, desperate people championed this issue and lost in the following cases:
1. United States v. Romero,
640 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981)
2. Lonsdale v. CIR, 661 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1981)(rejecting "even exchange" argument)
3. United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982)
4. Granzow v. CIR, 739 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1984)
5. Hansen v. United States, 744 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1984)
6. Perkins v. CIR, 746 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1984)
7. Schiff v. CIR, 751 F.2d 116 (2nd Cir. 1984)
8. Ficalora v. CIR, 751 F.2d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that income includes compensation for services)
9. Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1984)
10. United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747 (7th Cir. 1985)
11. Hyslep v. United States, 765 F.2d 1083 (11th Cir. 1985)
12. Coleman v. CIR, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986)
13. Stubbs v. Commissioner of IRS, 797 F.2d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument that wages are not taxable income as "patently frivolous")
14. Wilcox v. CIR, 848 F.2d 1007, 1008 (9th Cir. 1988)
15. Maisano v. United States, 908 F.2d 408, 409 (9th Cir. 1990), and Maisano v. United States, 940 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1991)
16. United States v. Gerards, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1993).
Jeff Dickstein, lawyer "extraordinare" from California, later Alaska, Montana, Tennessee and now Oklahoma, has written a book entitled Judicial Tyranny, which discusses this issue in great detail, including all the adverse decisions on this issue through 1989. When Jeff and I were about to start the conspiracy trial of Vern Holland and Dave Mauldin in Tulsa in August, 1990, Jeff announced that his book was hot off the press. When we got the first copy and looked at his book just days before we were to start that trial in federal court in Tulsa, we noticed that the front cover contained the seal of the local federal court as well as a likeness of one of the local federal judges. At times, Jeff can be harrowing. However, we got a hung jury in that case and afterwards, 6 of the jurors, including the forelady, came and joined Vern's patriot organization.
III. The IRS is a Delaware corporation:
Back in 1982 or 1983, somebody
started circulating the argument that the IRS was a private
corporation which had been created in Delaware in 1933. If it was
created only in 1933, then why do we have the following
appropriations for this agency found in acts of Congress a decade
42 Stat. 375 (2-17-22); 42 Stat. 454 (3-20-22); 42 Stat. 1096 (1-3-23); 43 Stat. 71 (4-4-24); 43 Stat. 693 (12-5-24); 43 Stat. 757 (1-20-25); 43 Stat. 770 (1-22-25); 44 Stat. 142 (3-2-26); 44 Stat. 868 (7-3-26); 44 Stat. 1033 (1-26-27); 45 Stat. 168, 1034 (1928); 68 Stat. 86, 145, 807 (1954).
This is indeed a frivolous argument and has properly been rejected by the courts; see Young v. IRS, 596 F.Supp. 141, 147 (N.D. Ind. 1984). The real issue is whether the IRS has been created by law.
IV. The IMF Argument:
Some contend that the Secretary of the Treasury is in reality a foreign agent under the control of the IMF; the argument has been rejected by the courts.
1. United States v. Rosnow,
977 F.2d 399, 413 (8th Cir. 1992)
2. United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992)
3. United States v. Higgins, 987 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 1993).
V. Non-resident Aliens:
Some contend we are for tax purposes non-resident aliens; again, this improper argument has been correctly rejected by the courts.
1. United States v. Sloan, 939
F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1991)
2. United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992)
3. United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993)
4. United States v. Mundt, 29 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1994) ("federal zone" case)
5. Larue v. United States, 959 F.Supp. 957 (C.D.Ill. 1997).
But the rejection by the courts of this issue has not deterred Lynn Meredith, who has continued to promote this argument through her book, Vultures in Eagles Clothing, via a multi-level sales scheme. Lawyers know that fraud is a knowing misrepresentation of facts (or in this case, law) to another upon which that other party relies to his detriment. Concerned Americans try the program promoted by Meredith in her book, but when they get into trouble, they get absolutely no help from Meredith as she refuses to even answer their calls. She spends her spare time on cruise ships.
Incidentally, when Lynn was here in Alabama, she stated to James Shackelford of Tuscaloosa, that she has made better than 3 million bux off this movement.
VI. The Form 1040 is Really a Codicil to a Will:
This argument was rejected in Richey v. Ind. Dept. of State Revenue, 634 N.E. 2d 1375 (Ind. 1994), along with other popular arguments of that date.
VII. Filing 1099sagainst IRS Agents:
At one time, some asserted that when an agent of the government inflicted damaged upon somebody, the proper response should be filing a Form 1099 against the agent because the agent was "enriched" by the damaged so inflicted. Parties doing this went to jail.
1. United States v. Yagow, 953
F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1992)
2. United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1992)
3. United States v. Dykstra, 991 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1993).
Of course, today we have essentially the same thing in the format of filing of common law liens. More than enough people have gone to jail with such lunacy.
VIII. Land Patents:
Back in 1983 and 1984, Carol Landi popularized an argument that the land patent was the highest and best form of title and that by updating the patent in your own name, you could defeat any mortgages. This contention violated many principles of real property and when Carol started trying to get patents for most of the land in California brought up into her own name, she went to jail. Others who have raised this crazy argument lost the issue.
1. Landi v. Phelps, 740 F.2d
710 (9th Cir. 1984)
2. Sui v. Landi, 209 Cal.Rptr. 449 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985)
3. Hilgeford v. People's Bank, 607 F.Supp. 536 (N.D.Ind. 1985)
4. Nixon v. Individual Head of St. Joseph Mtg. Co., 612 F.Supp. 253 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
5. Nixon v. Phillipoff, 615 F.Supp. 890 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
6. Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1986)
7. Britt v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n. of St. Louis, 505 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. App. 1987).
IX. Not a "Person" Under the Tax Code:
Some have contended that they were not "persons" under the Internal Revenue Code, an argument which has been lost.
1. Lovell v. United States,
755 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1984) (all individuals, natural or
unnatural, are subject to federal income tax on their
2. United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 91 (3d Cir. 1986)
3. United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986)(defendant who contended she was not a "taxpayer" because she was an "absolute, freeborn and natural individual" raised frivolous argument);
4. United States v. Price, 798 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1986)
5. Itz v. United States Tax Court, 1987 WL 15893, at 5, 87-2 USTC P 9497 (W.D.Tex. May 6, 1987) (claim of plaintiff that he is a "de jure" citizen as opposed to a "de facto" citizen is without merit)
6. Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1990)(plaintiff is a person subject to federal income tax, invalidating numerous other frivolous tax protester arguments)
7. United States v. Silevan, 985 F.2d 962, 970 (8th Cir. 1993)
8. United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1993)(these parties raised but had rejected the arguments that the US has no "inland jurisdiction," that wages are not income, and that the federal income tax is voluntary. "And finally, we reject appellant's contention that they are not citizens of the United States, but rather 'Free Citizens of the Republic of Minnesota,' and consequently not subject to taxation").
X. Notice of Levy Not Levy:
A popular argument currently circulating is that a mere notice of levy is not equal to a levy and thus may not be used for tax collection purposes. The courts have not accepted this idea.
1. United States v. Eiland,
223 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1955)
2. Rosenblum v. United States, 300 F.2d 843, 844-45 (1st Cir. 1962)
3. United States v. Pittman, 449 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1971)
4. In re Chicagoland Ideel Cleaners, Inc., 495 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1974)
5. Wolfe v. United States, 798 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1986)
6. Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 79 S.Ct. 641 (1959).
XI. The UCC Argument:
Some assert that some unknown treaty back in the 1930s placed us under the control of the "international bankers," thus every action filed in this country, both civil and criminal alike, is for the benefit of the bankers. Under these facts, when the government attacks a patriot, he should assert the UCC argument; this silly contention has been rejected.
1. United States v. Stoecklin,
848 F.Supp. 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
2. United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F.Supp. 224 (N.D.Tex. 1996)(also raised flag and common law court issues)
3. United States v. Klimek, 952 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Pa. 1997)(also raised nom de guerre and flag issues).
XII. The CFR Cross Reference Index:
The Code of Federal Regulations contains a separate volume which list various statutes and the regulations which implement those statutes. This is not an exclusive list nor is it an admission made by the government that there are no regulations for Title 26, U.S.C. Parties making this argument have suffered defeat.
1. United States v. Cochrane,
985 F.2d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 1993)
2. Russell v. United States, 95 CCH Tax Cases ¶ 50029 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
3. Reese v. CIR, 69 TCM 2814, TC Memo 1995-244 (1995)(this and several other arguments described as "legalistic gibberish")
4. Morgan v. CIR, 78 AFTR2d 96-6633 (M.D.Fla. 1996)
5. Stafford v. CIR, TCM 1997-50.
XIII. The Flag Issue:
A current popular argument is that the gold fringed flag indicates the admiralty jurisdiction of the court. Naturally, pro ses have made this argument and lost.
1. Vella v. McCammon, 671
F.Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D. Tex. 1987)(the argument has "no arguable
basis in law or fact")
2. Comm. v. Appel, 652 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa.Super. 1994)(the contention is a "preposterous claim")
3. United States v. Schiefen, 926 F.Supp. 877, 884 (D.S.D. 1995): in this case, the CFR cross reference index argument, and those regarding the UCC, common law courts and the flag issue were rejected.
Of course, there are other decisions which have not been published. But against all odds, Dave Miller still travels the country promoting this lost cause.
XIV. Common Law Court:
These courts have been declared non-existent.
1. Kimmel v. Burnet County Appraisal Dist., 835 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.App. 1992).
XV. "Nom de Guerre":
According to a book written by Berkheimer, a "nom de guerre" is a war name symbolized by a given name being written in capital letters. The argument contends that because of events in 1933, we have been made "enemies" and government indicates our status as enemies by the nom de guerre. If this is true, then why have the styles of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court since its establishment been in caps? This argument has gotten lots of people in trouble. For example, Mike Kemp of the Gadsden Militia defended himself on state marijuana charges with this argument and he was thrown into jail. I have not even seen a decent brief on this issue which was predicated upon cases you can find in an ordinary law library. In any event, at least one case has rejected this argument; see United States v. Klimek, 952 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Pa. 1997).
XV. Title 26 is not positive law:
Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985)(stating that "Congress's failure to enact a title into positive law has only evidentiary significance and does not render the underlying enactment invalid or unenforceable"); United States v. Zuger, 602 F. Supp. 889, 891-92 (D. Conn. 1984) (holding that "the failure of Congress to enact a title as such and in such form into positive law . . . in no way impugns the validity, effect, enforceability or constitutionality of the laws as contained and set forth in the title"), aff'd without op., 755 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 805 (1985); Young v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 141, 149 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (asserting that "even if Title 26 was not itself enacted into positive law, that does not mean that the laws under that title are null and void"); Berkshire Hathaway Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 780, 784 (1985) (averring that the I.R.C. "is truly 'positive law'"), aff'd, 802 F.2d 429 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
1. McKinney v. Regan, 599 F.Supp. 126, 129 (M.D.La. 1984)("Petitioner's shield of the 'Common Law' as an 'Unenfranchised Sovereign Individual of the United States of America, a Republic,' provides him with precisely the same degree of protection from federal income taxation as did the Ghost Dance of the Sioux warrior from the repeating rifles of the federal Calvary [sic] -- ZERO")
2. Lonsdale v. United States,
919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990)(the following arguments are
completely lacking in legal merit and patently frivolous: (1)
individuals ("free born, white, preamble, sovereign, natural,
individual common law 'de jure' citizens of a state, etc.") are not
"persons" subject to taxation under the Internal Revenue Code; (2)
the authority of the United States is confined to the District of
Columbia; (3) the income tax is a direct tax which is invalid
absent apportionment; (4) the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution is either invalid or applies only to corporations; (5)
wages are not income; (6) the income tax is voluntary); United
States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Buras, 633 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1980).
3. United States v. Kruger, 923 F.2d 587, 587-88 (8th Cir. 1991)("The Krugers' principle argument below and on appeal is that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution unlawfully purported to bestow citizenship upon non-white races and other 'artificial statutory persons.' This argument is absurd").
Perhaps the most famous "Wangrudite" was John Cheek, whose criminal conviction went to the U.S. Supreme Court; see Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604 (1991). John sent to me copies of his motions and briefs that he filed in his case, one of which was just a single page motion which in essence stated that he could not be prosecuted because he was not a 14th amendment citizen. Naturally, such a non-substantive motion was denied. Cheek's appeal would have involved this argument if he had reached the conclusion that it had merit. However, the only issue which was decided in the appeal to the Supreme Court regarded the validity of the "willfulness" jury instruction given at trial.
XVII. Implementing regulations:
United States v. Hartman, 915 F.Supp. 1227 (M.D.Fla. 1996): argument regarding implementing regs and the cross references in CFR index held frivolous. Stafford v. CIR, TCM 1997-50.
XVIII. Taxes are contractual:
In McLaughlin v. CIR, 832 F.2d 986, 987 (7th Cir. 1987), this argument was held to be without merit.
XVIV. Pro se, Sui juris, In propria persona:
Our experience shows the Court sees self representation as Pro se. If anyone can show us case law proving the court views or handles you differently if you use Pro se, Sui juris or In propria persona, please let us know. Otherwise, if you are representing yourself the court sees you as Pro se and we know of no different legal standing based on the title you use.
Caught received this from John B. Sims III in florida:
My research shows the following in Florida: ...the issue before this court is simply whether the express requirements of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, namely R. 1.110(c) and R. 1.110(e), apply with equal force and effect to a pro se litigant who prepares an answer to a complaint. This district has already determined that they do. Kohn v. City of Miami Beach, 611 So.2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)(finding no error in dismissing pro se's complaint with prejudice after four amendments; pro se litigant should not be treated differently from litigant represented by counsel); Carr v. Grace, 321 So.2d 618, 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)("Appellant's self representation does not relieve her of the obligation to comply with any appropriate rules of the court and the rules of civil procedure."), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 945 (Fla. 1977); see also § 454.18, Fla. Stat. (1993)("Any person . . . may conduct his own cause in any court of this state . . . subject to the lawful rules and discipline of such court . . . ."). While the majority cites to authority which in dicta says that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed to effect justice, see, e.g., Tillman v. State, 287 So.2d 693, 694 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 285 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1973) and cert. dismissed, 285 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1973) and Thomas v. State, 164 So.2d 857, 857 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964), this authority does not purport to exempt pro se litigants from our established rules of procedure and court.
A trial judge hearing a contested matter involving self-represented parties is placed in the ethical quandary of attempting to ensure that each pro se litigant is not disadvantaged because of his or her lack of knowledge of the law and procedure and, at the same time, serving as the neutral decision-maker in an adversarial system.3 See, generally, Bruce D. Sales, Connie J. Beck Richard K. Haan, Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 St. Louis U.L.J. 553 (1993). 666 So. 2d 1030, 21 Fla. Law W. D, 261 ROBINSON v. ROBINSON (Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1996)
When such a restraint is issued, (prohibition from appearing pro se) notice and hearing is usually required. In Platel v. Maguire, Voorhis Wells, P.A., 436 So.2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 440 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1983), the Fifth District Court of Appeal issued a restraining order against a pro se litigant who had abused his pro se right of access to the court and interfered with the effective administration of justice but it did not issue the order until after the pro se litigant was given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be prohibited from appearing pro se as an appellant or petitioner.627 So. 2d 1298, 18 Fla. Law W. D, 2631 MARTIN v. CIRCUIT COURT (Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1993)
Where a pro se litigant does not abide by the court's orders, it is logical that he or she should suffer the consequences. 624 So. 2d 765, 18 Fla. Law W. D, 2006 LAHTI v. PORN (Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1993)
At the trial level, the court is not obliged to grant every request for self-representation. There are instances in which acquiescence in such requests is likely to result in manifest injustice. Williams v. State, supra; Capetta v. State, 204 So.2d 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), rev'd in part, 216 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1008 (1969). Similarly, appellate courts considering requests for self-representation take into account the likelihood of injustice to or intransigence by the pro se litigant. See, e.g., Blanton v. State, 561 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
We conclude that it is a mistake to hold a pro se litigant to a lesser standard than a reasonably competent attorney. Section 454.18, Florida Statutes (1991) clearly provides "any person . . . may conduct his own cause in any court of this state . . . subject to the lawful rules and discipline of such court." Likewise, in Carr v. Grace, 321 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 945 (1977), we observed a party's self-representation does not relieve the party of the obligation to comply with any appropriate rules of civil procedure.1 Application of any lesser standard can only foment litigation by encouraging a litigant to act pro se and, when his seeming ability to plead a cause of action fails, to then engage an attorney to start again. Moreover, there is no reason to set lower standards for pro se litigants in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit since there is in place an ongoing program purposely designed to make qualified members of the bar available to litigants who qualify for their services.2 Compassion for a pro se litigant and justice under law are entirely different concepts that should not be confused. Further, we should avoid the temptation to require governmental entities to defend because they seemingly have an inexhaustible supply of legal talent available. To do so would penalize the public who ultimately pays the bill. 611 So. 2d 538, 17 Fla. Law W. D, 2745 KOHN v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, et al., (Dist. Ct. App. 3rd Dist. 1992)