The following charges of judicial misconduct were filed on September 11, 1997 against Judge Francis A. Gembala for his engaging in actions in violation of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct.

Eugene Alpern
P.O. Box 672
Morton Grove, IL 60053-0672

September 11, 1997

State of Illinois
Judicial Inquiry Board
100 W. Randolph St. - 14-500
Chicago, IL 60601

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION
OF JUDGE FRANCIS A. GEMBALA
FOR VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

I have information of possible willful misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, and other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice and that brings both his judicial office and the judiciary into disrepute on the part of Francis A. Gembala of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. A judge should strive to maintain confidence in our judicial system (Preamble to Code of Judicial Conduct), but Judge Gembala's actions destroy confidence in the judicial system. Unless he is severely disciplined or removed from office, he will continue to violate the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that he had conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land, in violation of his duty under the law, in "fraud upon the court" and to aid and abet others in criminal activity, thus making himself a principal in the criminal activity.

BACKGROUND

A complaint for Declaratory Judgment was filed as case no. 96-CH-5651, EUGENE W. ALPERN v. PHYLLIS ALPERN, ALLEN S. GABE, ROBERT K. BLAIN, and REGINA SCANNICCHIO, and the full and complete record of that case is incorporated as a part of this Complaint. The purpose of the case was to declare a judgment in case no. 91-D-5122 void for reasons stated in the complaint. The 96-CH-5651 case has been concluded, with the issuance of a void judgment due to, among various reasons, fraud upon the court by the defendant's attorneys and by Judge Gembala (see infra). Since fraud upon the court voids the entire proceeding, In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Gilmore, 345 Ill. 28, 177 N.E. 710 (1931), this complaint has nothing to do with the voidness of the purported decision, but on the violations of judicial conduct of Judge Gembala.

In case no. 96-CH-5651, Judge Gembala judgment stated that:

"Thus this court lacks jurisdiction to grant plaintiff the relief he seeks, which amounts to a vacatur of the Judgment of Dissolution. Moreover, this court is aware of no authority which would permit it to vacate an order of the Appellate Court."

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

The Illinois Supreme Court issued the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct as Supreme Court Rules ("SCR"). The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct is incorporated herein as a part of this Complaint. Supreme Court Rules are law, and must be followed by litigants, attorneys, and all Circuit and Appellate Court judges. Compliance with SCR is not discretionary, but is mandatory. Any noncompliance is unlawful, and judges have no lawful authority to act unlawfully.

The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 62(A) states: A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 63(A) states:

(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities

(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.

INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that every court of lawful jurisdiction has the inherent power to determine subject-matter jurisdiction. Inherent power of a court is not dependent on whether a court has jurisdiction, otherwise it could never have the lawful authority to determine if it had jurisdiction in any matter before it. This inherent power to determine jurisdiction applies not only to determine its own jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction of any other court. People v. Childs, 278 Ill.App.3d 65, 663 N.E.2d 161 (4th Dist. 1996) ("The duty to vacate a void judgment is based on the inherent power of a court to expunge from its records void acts of which it has knowledge."); Evans v. Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 565 N.E.2d 724 (2nd Dist. 1990) ("A court has inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records.").

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that under the Supreme Law of the Land:

"Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law, and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." [Emphasis in original]. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991).

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that the void judgment brought before him, remains void even if he did not vacate it. Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that the void judgment was not affirmed nor validated by his failure to properly exercise his judicial duty.

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that he had the duty, and had no discretion, to vacate void orders and judgments. Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that he had conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of his duty as a judge, and engaged in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land.

TREASON

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known that, by his previous allegation that he had no jurisdiction, he committed treason against the Constitution. "We [Judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, then to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution." [clarification added] U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).

Judge Gembala should not have engaged in treason to the Constitution, a Constitution to which he has taken a personal oath to support. VIOLATION OF SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND

All judges have taken an oath to, and their lawful authority depends on their complete and full compliance with, the Constitution of the United States of America, and the Supreme Law of the Land.

The Supreme of the Land can be found in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. In Old Wayne Mut. L. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907), the Supreme Court ruled that:

"Chief Justice Marshall had long before observed in Ross v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.ed. 608, 617, that, upon principle, the operation of every judgment must depend on the power of the court to render that judgment. In Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L.ed. 1170, 1189, it was said to be well settled that the jurisdiction of ANY COURT exercising authority over a subject `may be inquired into in EVERY OTHER COURT when the proceedings in the former are relied upon and brought before the latter by a party claiming the benefit of such proceedings,' and the rule prevails whether `the decree or judgment has been given, in a court of admiralty, chancery, ecclesiastical court, or court of common law, or whether the point ruled has arisen under the laws of nations, the practice in chancery, or the municipal laws of states.'" [Emphasis added].

In Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828), the court stated that "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers. This distinction runs through all the cases on the subject; and it proves, that the jurisdiction of ANY COURT exercising authority over a subject, may be inquired into IN EVERY COURT, when the proceedings of the former are relied on and brought before the latter, by the party claiming the benefit of such proceedings." [Emphasis added].

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, the law and the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that ANY COURT and EVERY COURT can vacate a void order. Judge Gembala conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land, and of Rule 62(A) and Rule 63(A).

VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF ILLINOIS

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, the Illinois Supreme Court decisions that ANY COURT can vacate a void order.

Contrary to Judge Gembala's alleged non-finding, and considering that the writer is a non-lawyer, he found many Illinois Supreme Court and Appellate Court decisions that grant all judges lawful authority to vacate the 91-D-5122 judgment before him. As only a few of the many Illinois citations, the following are presented:

In City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Com., 65 Ill.2d 108, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976), the court stated that "A judgment, order or decree entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, is void, and may be attacked at any time or in ANY COURT, either directly or collaterally." [Emphasis added].

In R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill.2d 304, 309, 489 N.E.2d 1360 (1986), the court stated that "[a] judgment, order or decree entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, is void, and may be attacked at any time or IN ANY COURT, either directly or collaterally." [Emphasis added].

In Evans v. Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 565 N.E.2d 724 (2nd Dist. 1990) the court stated that "a void judgment, order or decree may be attacked at any time or in ANY COURT, either directly or collaterally" [Emphasis added].

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that the phrases "ANY COURT", "IN ANY COURT", "IN EVERY COURT" and "EVERY OTHER COURT" found in Court decisions means any court in Cook County, any court in the State of Illinois, or in any court, state or federal, in the United States, as a void order has no legal force or effect, and is not, and could not be, at any time a final judgment.

In People v. Streeper, 12 Ill.2d 204, 145 N.E.2d 625 (1957), the Court stated that "The jurisdiction of the court must be determined as of the commencement of the action. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565".

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that he had to determine the question of subject-matter jurisdiction at the commencement of the 90-D-2724 action in 1970 and the 91-D-5122 action in 1971. Judge Gembala did not comply with the law, and did not determine whether jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Cook County existed at either pertinent times.

Judge Gembala conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of Rule 62(A) and Rule 63(A). FRAUD UPON THE COURT

"Fraud upon the court" occurs whenever any officer of the court commits fraud before a tribunal. A judge is not a court; he is under law an officer of the court, and he must not engage in any action to deceive the court. Trans Aero Inc. v. LaFuerga Area Boliviana, 24 F.3d 457 (2nd Cir. 1994); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985) (fraud upon the court exists "where the judge has not performed his judicial duties").

The Supreme Court, In re Eugene Lee Armentrout et al., 99 Ill.2d 242, 75 Ill.Dec. 703, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983), stated that:

"Fraud encompasses a broad range of human behavior, including " ' * * * anything calculated to deceive, * * * whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by silence, by word of mouth or by look or gesture.' " (Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 419, 435, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858, citing People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Gilmore (1931), 345 Ill. 28, 46, 177 N.E. 710; In re Alschuler (1944), 388 Ill. 492, 503-04; Black's Law Dictionary 594 (5th ed. 1979).) Too, this court has previously disciplined lawyers even though their fraudulent misconduct did not harm [99 Ill.2d 252] any particular individual. In re Lamberis (1982), 93 Ill.2d 222, 229, 66 Ill.Dec. 623, 443 N.E.2d 549."

The decision by Judge Gembala, in stating that "Moreover, this court is aware of no authority which would permit it to vacate an order of the Appellate Court." either was a statement made to deceive the parties before the court, was contrary to known law, and was a fraud upon the court by Judge Gembala, or was a demonstration of his lack of competency, in violation of Rule 63(A), or was a demonstration of his failure to respect and comply with the law, in violation of Rule 62(A), Judges should not engage in fraud upon the court, issuing decisions that he knew, or should have known, under law were void and in violation of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct.

JUDGE GEMBALA CANNOT CONFER JURISDICTION ON A COURT THAT LACKS JURISDICTION

Judge Gembala has no lawful authority to confer jurisdiction on any court that does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, yet Judge Gembala has attempted to confer jurisdiction on the Appellate Court upon which no subject-matter jurisdiction was ever conferred by law. Martin v. Schillo, 389 Ill. 607, 60 N.E.2d 392 (1945) ("Jurisdiction of the subject matter is always conferred by law.").

The law in Illinois is stated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Before the Appellate Court could rule on the Appeal, it first had to determine if the lower court held subject-matter jurisdiction. After its finding that there was no Petition in the record of the 91-D-5122 case, according to the prior decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, as cited below, the only valid decision that it could make was that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Since the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court held no subject-matter jurisdiction and any ruling, other than to vacate the trial court's order as issued without subject- matter jurisdiction, was void. The Appellate Court's purported finding that the trial court held jurisdiction as to a cause of action was void ab initio since it's findings that there was no Petition in the record of the case deprived that court of any subject-matter jurisdiction to issue any order except an order to vacate the trial court's void judgment.

The Appellate Court was bound by the following Supreme Court decisions. In In re Contest of Elections for Governor, 93 Ill.2d 465 (1983), the court stated:

"The petition required to put the court in motion and give it jurisdiction must be in conformity with the statute granting the right and must contain all the statements which the statute says the petition shall state, - and if the petition fails to contain all of these essential elements the court is without jurisdiction. citing Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118 (1930)." [Emphasis added].

"The court derived its jurisdiction to proceed in a matter solely from statute, ordinary presumptions of jurisdiction do not obtain, and every fact necessary to support such jurisdiction must appear from the face of the record." People v. Heizer, 36 Ill.2d 438, 223 N.E.2d 128 (1967) [Emphasis added.]

The trial court in case 91-D-5122 lacked authority to act for want of subject matter jurisdiction. People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) ("If it could not legally hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, -- it had no authority to make that finding.").

In I.C.R.R. Co. v. Hasenwinkle, 232 Ill. 224, 227 (1908), the court stated that "The law presumes nothing in favor of the jurisdiction of a court exercising special statutory powers, such as those given by statute under which the court acted, (Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Galt, 133 Ill. 657), and the record must affirmatively show the facts necessary to give jurisdiction. The record must show that the statute was complied with".

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that in all courts of limited jurisdiction, such as domestic relations, there is no presumption of subject-matter jurisdiction, People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill.2d 77, 84 (1983); People ex rel. Curtin v. Heizer, 36 Ill.2d 438 (1967), and that subject-matter jurisdiction can only be determined by an inspection of the full and complete record of the case. State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill.2d 294, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986); Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 241 (1943). Contrary to law, Judge Gembala presumed subject-matter jurisdiction to have been conferred without an inspection of the full and complete record of the 91-D-5122 action.

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known that three Appellate Court Justices and the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County inspected the full and complete record of the case, and all four found that no Petition existed in the record of the case. Judge Gembala knew, or should have known that, under Illinois law, Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 241 (1943) ("A judgment void upon its face and requiring only an inspection of the record to demonstrate its invalidity is a mere nullity, in legal effect no judgment at all, conferring no right and affording no justification."), the inspection by the four parties substantiated that the record of the 91-D-5122 could not sustain a valid judgment. This finding has never been controverted, and Judge Gembala had no lawful authority to issue any ruling in violation of the law.

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that he did not have any lawful authority to overrule the findings of the Appellate Court Justices, but that under law he must accept their findings. Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that the finding by the Appellate Court that there was no Petition in the record of the case must be accepted by him, and he knew, or should have known, that he must rule based on the law that pertains to cases on which there is no Petition in the record of the case.

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that the Appellate Court acted without lawful authority and he knew, or should have known, that he could not utilize a void order in his decision.

TRESPASSER OF THE LAW

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, the law relative to void orders. Judge Gembala knew, or should have known that under the law in Illinois he was a trespasser of the law. Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870) ("if the magistrate has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his process, are trespassers."); Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828).

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that he had no lawful authority to act directly or indirectly in such a manner that allowed a judgment to stand when the judge issuing that judgment had no subject-matter jurisdiction, He knew, or should have known, that he was conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct supporting a void judgment in violation of the law.

INTERFERENCE WITH LEGAL DUTY OF LITIGANT

Judge Gembala knew, or reasonably should have known that when he interfered with a litigant's legal rights and duty in case no. 96-CH-5651 to address the court, he engaged in actions in violation of the Appellate Courts' requirement that "a litigant has a duty, independent of that of his or her attorney, to follow the progress of the case and TO TAKE ACTION WHEN COUNSEL DOES NOT." [Emphasis added]. Sakun v. Taffer, 268 Ill.App.3d 343, 643 N.E.2d 1271 (1st Dist. 1994); Burton v. Estrada (1986), 149 Ill.App.3d 965, 972, 501 N.E.2d 254, citing Falcon Manufacturing Co. v. Nationwide Brokers, Inc. (1984), 123 Ill.App.3d 496, 499-500, 462 N.E.2d 562; American Consulting Association, Inc. v. Spencer (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 917, 922-23, 427 N.E.2d 579.

Judge Gembala knew, or reasonably should have known that he conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct that deprived the litigant of his due process rights, and that he conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct to interfere with the litigant's legal duty as placed upon the litigant by the Appellate Courts.

FAILURE TO VACATE VOID APPELLATE ORDER

Judge Gembala knew, or reasonably should have known that no reviewing courts have any lawful authority to affirm or validate void judgments or orders. Judge Gembala knew, or reasonably should have known that the Illinois Supreme Court had no lawful authority to review or affirm the void Order of the Illinois Appellate Court. The Supreme Court acted correctly when it refused to hear the appeal of the Appellate Court, as it knew that it had no lawful authority to review an Appellate Court's void order.

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that he not only should have vacated the void order of the 91-D-5122 court based on the Complaint of the Plaintiff in the 96-CH-5651 case, but even has the lawful authority to vacate the void judgment of the 91-D-5122 action and the void judgment of the First District Appellate Court sua sponte on his own motion. People v. Thompson, 231 N.E.2d 605 (1967).

EXCEEDED LAWFUL AUTHORITY

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known that void orders have no legal force or effect. Yet Judge Gembala engaged in conduct that attempted to made a void judgment valid, contrary to any and all known law. COVERUP OF THE UNLAWFUL ACT OF JUDGE-SHOPPING

Judge Gembala knew, or reasonably should have known, that the act of "judge-shopping" had occurred in the procurement of purported jurisdiction which vitiated the lawful authority of the 91-D-5122 judge. FRAUD UPON THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Judge Gembala knew, or reasonably should have known, that he was engaged in the waste of judicial resources. The Respondent suggests that the waste of judicial resources is a fraud upon the State of Illinois.

JUDGE GEMBALA SHOULD NOT AID AND ABET NOR PARTICIPATE IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Judge Gembala knew, or reasonably should have known that by his delaying to vacate the void order, any execution on the void order could lead to a criminal act being performed by others, based on the void order, and that no judge should aid and abet criminal actions. Judge Gembala knew, or reasonably should have known that, should anyone execute on the void order and if such execution should interfere with interstate commerce, such as interfering with the Respondent's purchase of any items involved in interstate commerce, United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), then Judge Gembala would become a principal, 18 U.S.C. Section 1, in the interference with interstate commerce.

Extortion is defined in Black's Law Dictionary - 6th Edition as:

"The obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."

Should anyone attempt to execute on the void judgment that Judge Gembala had, under his judicial responsibility, a duty to vacate, or the void judgment issued by Judge Gembala in case no. 96-CH-5651, then he would have personally aided and abetted a scheme of extortion and other criminal activity. Judge Gembala would then be involved in the unlawful act of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1951.

CONNIVANCE WITH THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY IN COVERING UP THE DISAPPEARANCE OF COURT RECORDS

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that there is currently a dispute between the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County and the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County relative to the disappearance of court records. Judge Gembala was informed in the 96-CH-5651 action of the multiple filing of identical actions before the Circuit Court of Cook County and the facts of the missing court files.

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that under the Illinois Constitution, the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County had the duty to preserve the full and complete records of all cases. He knew that the records of cases no. 90-D-2724 and 91-D-5122 were not preserved.

Judge Gembala knew, or should have known, that he engaged in, and connived in, actions to support the Clerk of the Circuit Court in her violation of her Constitutional and statutory duties to preserve the records of cases no. 90-D-2724 and 91-D-5122.

CONCLUSION

Judge Francis A. Gembala has no respect for the law, does not comply with the law, does not install public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, is not faithful to the law, and does not maintain professional competence in the law. Further, he conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly: engaged in conduct in violation of his duty as a judge and of the Code of Judicial Conduct, engaged in actions in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land and the law of Illinois, engaged in acts of judicial treason, committed fraud upon the court, engaged in acts as a trespasser of the law, exceeded his lawful authority, engaged in actions to interfere with the litigant's legal duty imposed on the litigant by the Appellate Court, engaged in actions to coverup the unlawful act of judge-shopping, committed fraud upon the State of Illinois, aided and abetted criminal activity, and connived with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County in covering up the disappearance of court records.

I request that a full and complete investigation into the willful violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by Judge Francis A. Gembala be made by the Judicial Inquiry Board.

Yours truly,
Eugene Alpern

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On September 17, 1997 Judge Francis A. Gembala recused himself from case no. 91-D-5122. [NOTE: A judge may not recuse himself, under law, unless he is in violation of the Rules of Judicial Conduct. By recusing himself, Judge Francis A. Gembala has admitted that he was acting in violation of the Rules of Judicial Conduct.

Caught also received the following feedback regarding this complaint from CLR.ORG.

A judge may recuse himself to prevent a violation of the Rules of Judicial Conduct. While this may be true before the judge hears a matter, we suggest it is not true during the hearing of a matter and when the judge has already issued void orders.
What should also be taken into account is that there was no subject-matter jurisdiction nor in personam jurisdiction ever conferred upon the trial court at any time. In a statutory proceeding, the law states specifically that a Complaint/Petition that complies strictly with the statute under which the case is filed, must be filed and must be found in the record of the case.
The Appellate Court admits that there is no Petition in the record of the case. Evidence indicates that a valid Petition was never filed. The record of the case also provides no evidence that a valid summons was ever served upon the Respondent, or in fact, if there ever was a valid summons.
There are other reasons why the judge was without jurisdiction at any time. For the reasons stated, Judge Gembella was acting in violation of the law and of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

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